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Abstract – In many applications, the password is sent as cleartext to the server to be authenticated thus providing the
eavesdropper with opportunity to steal valuable data. This paper presents a simple protocol based on zero knowledge proof
by which the user can prove to the authentication server that he has the password without having to send the password to the
server as either cleartext or in encrypted format. Thus the user can authenticate himself without having to actually reveal the
password to the server. Also, another version of this protocol has been proposed which makes use of public key
cryptography thus adding one more level of security to the protocol and enabling mutual authentication between the client &
server.
Keywords- computer network, computer security, authentication protocol, zero-knowledge proof , password.

I.

authenticate themselves to the server. However, the
other way round authentication is not possible.
The other version of this protocol i.e. ZK-PAP
with PKE incorporates the concept of public key
cryptography[4] thus adding a second level of
security to the protocol and also enabling two-way
authentication, i.e. the client can authenticate the
server and vice versa.
c) Organization of paper
The paper has been briefly divided into four
sections. The first section introduces the readers to
the basic notations and concept such as zeroknowledge proof [6,7,10] and PAP [11] which one
needs to understand before he can understand the
protocol proposed. The second section gives a basic
idea about the CHAP authentication protocol which is
a relevant work in this area.
The third section gives some brief idea about the
basic primitives or building block of the protocol
followed by description of working of the protocol
proposed in this paper.

INTRODUCTION

a) Motivation
In today's world of Internet, most of the people
have
mail accounts or accounts with social
networking sites etc. where they need to authenticate
themselves before logging in and being able to access
their resources. However, very few people are
actually aware of the fact that many of such
applications
make
use
of
PAP(Password
Authentication Protocol) in order to authenticate the
users which is not very secure.
In case of PAP, though the password is stored in
hashed format on the server along with its
corresponding username making it less vulnerable to
attacks, still the fact that the username-password pair
travels in clear on the wire makes it vulnerable to
attacks like eavesdropping & packet sniffing which
will easily reveal the sensitive data to the intruder.
Here it is assumed that only the user knows the
sensitive data(password) which is a secret
information for him.
b) Contribution
This paper presents a protocol using which the
users can be authenticated by the authentication
server without having to reveal the password. This
protocol, based on zero knowledge proof[6], thus
protects the sensitive data from being revealed to the
server or any intruder listening to the communication
channel. It is meant to to be basically used in
distributed system or peer to peer networks.
This paper first presents a simple version of the
ZK-PAP in which the user can authenticate himself
to the server without revealing the password[8]. The
protocol uses a challenge-response mechanism
(between the server and client) based on nonce. A
nonce is a randomly generated number to be used
only once throughout the session in order to avoid
replay attacks.
The simple version of this protocol supports only
one way authentication i.e. only the clients can

II. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
a) Notations
In this section, we shall be discussing some of
the basic notations which we will encounter in the
paper later. Key k K is symmetric session key which
will be established between the user and client in
every session to carry out the further communication.
H is a collision resistant hash function used to
generate the hash value of any data. As discussed
already, nonce is a randomly generated data denoted
by Ni (N1, N2 etc) and transformation function is any
simple mathematical function which can be applied
on integer data (assuming that nonce here is integer in
nature).
Also we have encryption & decryption functions
which are denoted by E & D respectively. In case of
asymmetric (public key) cryptography, EPR-A & EPU-A
represent encryption using private key & public key
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of A respectively. Similarly, DPR-A & DPU-A represent
decryption using private key & public key of A
respectively. In case of symmetric (private key)
cryptography, as we have no concept of public key
hence EPR-A & DPR-A represent encryption and
decryption respectively using the secret key of A.
b) Definitions
Here we shall be discussing the concepts of zeroknowledge proofs and PAP in brief.
Zero-knowledge Proof :
Let us first discuss the concept of zero knowledge
proofs. The concept of zero-knowledge can be
explained with the help of a classical example of two
identical balls[9]. Suppose a person, say 'A' has two
identical billiards ball of different colors, say red and
blue. Now he want to convince his friend, say 'B' that
the two balls are of different colors.
The basic approach will be to give the two balls
to B so that he can see them and confirm the fact that
the two balls are of different colors or not. However,
in this scheme B gains knowledge about the colors of
the balls.
Using the zero-knowledge approach, however A
can convince his friend B that he has balls of different
colors without having B see the balls actually. To do
this, A blindfolds B and then places a ball on each of
B's hand. Though B has no idea about which ball is of
which color but A can see the color of the two balls.
Now A asks B to take his hands at the back and
either swap the arrangement of the two balls or keep
the arrangement same as original and show him the
balls again. A sees the new arrangement of the balls
and lets B know whether the balls were swapped or
not. Thus A can prove to B that he has given him
balls of different colors without revealing anything
about color of the balls.
Let us say they play this game 't' times, where the
value of t is large. If A tries to cheat B by giving him
both the balls of same color, then the probability that
A will still be able to answer correctly in each game
is 2-t which is negligible for large value of t.
This is a zero knowledge approach since A
convinced B that he has two balls of different colors
but at end of all games, B does not gain any
knowledge about the colors of the two balls or any
knowledge on how to distinguish the two balls.
Another classic example to understand zeroknowledge proof is given in [15] which uses the
example of magic cave to explain the same concept.
Password Authentication Protocol:
Let us now discuss about the Password
Authentication Protocol(PAP)[12,13]. PAP is an
authentication protocol which is being used by pointto-point protocol to validate and authenticate users
before they can access resources. This protocol
requires the user to send the username and password
to the authenticating server in cleartext thus making it
vulnerable to packet sniffing & eavesdropping.
After the server receives the username &
password, it generates hash of the password using the

same algorithm which was used to hash the password
before storing it into the password file. Then the
generated hash is matched against the stored
password hash corresponding to the entered user
name. If a match is found, then the user is allowed to
login else access is denied.
Here, though the password is stored in encrypted
format on the server thus making it less vulnerable to
attacks but sending the unencrypted ASCII password
over the network makes the protocol insecure.
III.

RELEVANCE TO PRIOR WORK

One of the relevant work done in this field is the
CHAP(challenge
handshake
authentication
protocol)[1,2,3,5,12]. This protocol is based on
challenge-response model and makes use of singleuse keys to provide more security. However this
system does not completely eliminate the need to
send data over wire in plain text format.
This protocol works in the following manner :
when a user types his user name, the server generates
a random key and sends it to the client machine(user)
in unencrypted format. The user then encrypts his
password using the received key and sends it to the
server. The authenticator program on server encrypts
the password corresponding to the received username
using the generated key & matches it against the data
received from the client machine.
The user is allowed to login and access his
resources if the match occurs else access is denied.
Also, CHAP keeps sending various challenges to
the client (user) throughout the session to verify that
only an authorized person is logged in.
The main advantages of the scheme are as
follows:
 It solves the problem of logged in but unattended
systems.
 Also, the password no more travels in clear but
in encrypted form thus solving the problem of
packet sniffing or eavesdropping.
However, this scheme poses the following
disadvantages :
 As the randomly generated key is sent to the user
in clear, an intruder can get the key by packetsniffing.
 The password on the server is stored in
unencrypted format thus making it more
vulnerable to attacks.
 Also, on continuously sniffing a line, the intruder
will be able collect many key-ciphertext pairs for
a user's password thus gaining some knowledge
about the user's password.

IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
The algorithms which are designed to perform
any cryptographic
operation are known as
cryptographic primitives. The primitives are the
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building blocks which are used to create more
complex cryptographic protocols to achieve various
security goals. The primitives can be classified into
two major groups : symmetric (or private key) &
asymmetric (or public key). We will now define
some of the primitives used in the proposed protocol:
a) Collision Resistant Hash Function[16] : A
collision resistant hash function is a function which
takes a variable length input and produces a fixed
length output with the property that even slightest
change in the input will reflect change in the
output(hash value). The input to hash function is
called a message and the output is known as hash
value.
The collision resistant hash function exhibits the
following four properties:
 It should be easy to compute hash value for any
message.
 It should be infeasible to deduce the message
from the hash value. This is known as one way
property.
 It should be infeasible to find two different
messages say m1 & m2 with same hash value.
This property is known as collision resistance.
b) It should be infeasible to change a message
without reflecting any change in it's hash value.
This kind of hash function has many applications
such as digital signature, MAC etc.Block Cipher : It
is one of the most important primitives of various
cryptographic algorithms & protocols like MAC &
various hash functions. It is used mainly to provide
confidentiality of data. Block cipher works on fixed
length inputs known as blocks. These ciphers encrypt
or decrypt one block of data at a time.
Some of
the most widely used block ciphers are DES (Data
Encryption Standard), 3DES (Triple DES) and AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard).Stream Cipher : It is
another most important & common primitives for
various cryptographic algorithms. In this case, the
encryption or decryption of data takes place one bit at
a time. Thus it can be treated as a block cipher with
block size of 1 bit.
Some
of
the
most
commonly used stream cipher algorithms are ORYX,
SEAL
&
RC4.Transformation
Function
:
Transformation function is any simple mathematical
function which can be applied to an integer. Here the
transformation function is applied on the nonces to
avoid replay attacks.
V.

access various resources. The password is secret to
the user which only he can change when logged in to
the application and the same change is registered with
the server.
The simple version of the algorithm provides
only one way authentication, that is, only server can
authenticate a client system. Let us designate the
server and client as verifier and prover for ease of
understanding.
The protocol is initiated by the prover by sending
his username and a challenge(nonce) N1 to the
verifier in clear. The verifier responds by generating a
random session key, say k and another
challenge(nonce) N2. Then it concatenates N1, N2 &
k and encrypts them using the hash of the password
corresponding to the received user name. This
encrypted data is then sent to the prover.
The prover now decrypts the data using the hash
of its password as key, fetches the values of N1, N2
& K and verifies if the value of N1 received is same
as the one it had sent to the verifier. The nonce N1
here is used only to avoid any replay attack. If the
value of the received & the generated nonce do not
match, then the received message is discarded else it
retrieves the session key. The prover then applies the
transformation function on the nonce N2, encrypts it
with the received session key and sends it to the
verifier.
Once the verifier receives the encrypted message,
it then decrypts the message with the generated
session key and matches it with the expected value. If
match occurs, then the user is allowed to login to his
account and access resources else access is denied.
As in CHAP, in ZK-PAP, a series of challenges can
be exchanged between the prover & verifier through
out the session to verify that only an authorized
person is logged in.
The main advantages of this protocol are as
follows:
 The authentication is done without the need of
the password to travel across the wire.
 The password in the password file on server is
stored in encrypted format thus making it less
vulnerable to attacks.
 The security of the protocol mainly depends on
the strength of the encryption algorithm being
used. Thus using the standard algorithms like
AES, DES etc will provide high degree of
security to the protocol.
 Use of nonce at each step helps us prevent replay
attacks.
Here it is assumed that the security of the server
is not compromised else the protocol becomes
vulnerable to attacks. In this protocol, we can also use
time stamp instead of nonce, however that will incur
an overhead of keeping all the communicating
systems synchronized in time

THE PROPOSED SECURITY PROTOCOL :
ZERO
KNOWLEDGE
PASSWORD
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL (ZKPAP)

As in general scenario, every user has a
username & password used to login to a system to
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.
A

the server and sends the encrypted message to
the server.
 The server decrypts the received value with its
private key & then with the shared session key.
 The user A is allowed to login if the server
receives the expected value else access is denied.
As it can be seen from the above steps, only
server will be able to extract the correct value of
nonce N1 as it was encrypted with server's public
key. Thus, if the client receives correct value of the
nonce N1 from the server, it knows that the message
was sent by the server itself and not by some intruder.
Thus, use of public key encryption also allows the
client to authenticate the server thus enabling mutual
authentication.
Also, a series of challenge can be exchanged
between the server and client to ensure that only an
authorized person is logged in. This will also solve
the problem of logged-in but unattended systems or
workstations.

S

IDA, N1

EH(pwd)[N1||k||N2]
EK[F(N2)]

Fig 1 : Zero Knowledge Password Authentication Protocol

Notations used:
IDA : Username of A
N1 & N2 : Nonce
k : Shared secret key between A(user) & S(server)
F : Transformation function
EK : Encryption using key k
H[pwd] : Hash of the password

A

S

EPU-S[IDA, N1]

EPU-A[EH(pwd)[N1||k||N2]]

VI. ZK-PAP WITH PKE

EPU-S[EK[F(N2)]]

This section briefs about the other version of the
ZK-PAP protocol described above. This version of
the protocol makes use of public key encryption[4] in
order to give an added level of security and also
enable two-way authentication ie. the verifier(server)
can authenticate the prover(client) and vice versa.
Here it is assumed that all the users have (or can
get) the public key of the server and the server has or
can receive public keys of all the users. The protocol
works as follows:









Fig 2 : ZK-PAP with PKE

Notations used:
IDA : User name of A
N1 & N2 : Nonce
k : Shared secret key between A(user) & S(server)
F : Transformation function
EK : Encryption using key k
H[pwd] : Hash of the password
EPU-S & EPU-A : Encryption using public key of S & A
respectively

The user,say A sends his username and a nonce
to the server after encrypting it with server's
public key.
The server decrypts the message with his private
key and extracts the value of the nonce N1.
The server then generates a nonce N2 and a
random session key k, concatenates N1, k & N2 ,
encrypts them with hash of the password of user
A, then with public key of the user A and sends VII. CONCLUSION
the encrypted data to A.
User A then decrypts the received encrypted data
This paper illustrates ZK-PAP and ZK-PAP with
with his private key, then with the hash of his
PKE protocols, both of which are based on the
password and extracts the values of N1, N2 & k.
concept of zero-knowledge proof. The ability to
He then matches the value of received nonce N1
authenticate oneself without having to reveal one's
& the generated value of N1.
password will make the system less vulnerable to
If match occurs, then A extracts the value of k &
attacks. As the protocol uses the hash of the password
nonce N2, applies the transformation function F
as key, using a strong encryption cipher (in which
on N2 and encrypts the transformed value first
with the session key k, then with public key of
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key-recovery is hard) will strengthen the security of
this protocol.
Also using the public-key encryption in ZK-PAP
with PKE adds a second level of security and enables
mutual authentication between the client & server.
Both protocol proposed here are simple & efficient,
thus enabling their practical use.
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